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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between market concentration, risk-taking, 
and bank performance using a unique dataset of the BRIC banks over the period 
2003-2010. We find a negative association between market concentration and 
performance, in support of the “quiet life” hypothesis. We also find that banks taking 
a lower level of risks perform better, in favour of prudential practice. Moreover, the 
BRICs’ banking sectors were all negatively affected by the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis with China and Russia being the least and most affected, respectively. On 
average Chinese and Brazilian banks outperform Indian and Russian ones, indicating 
that China and Brazil have more favourable institutional infrastructure. These results 
are robust to alternative model specifications and estimation techniques. Our analysis 
may have important policy implications for bankers and regulators in the BRICs and 
other developing and transition countries.  
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Highlights 
 The “quiet life” hypothesis holds in the BRICs’ banking markets. 
 Banks taking a lower level of risk are more efficient. 
 Chinese and Brazilian banks outperform Indian and Russian ones. 
 The BRIC banks have recovered rapidly after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks are the cornerstone of a country’s financial system, especially in the developing 
countries where capital markets are underdeveloped. The global financial crisis in 
2007-2008 has caused great turmoil in the banking sectors of the developed world. In 
sharp contrast to the clustered collapses of international financial giants in advanced 
economies, there were fewer bank failures in Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
(hereinafter the BRICs). In fact, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has catalyzed the 
catching up process for banks in the developing world. According to Bloomberg, as of 
31 July 2011, 4 of the world top 10 banks by market capitalization were from the 
BRICs; and 44% of the world top 100 banks belonged to developing countries, 
increased by 14 percentage points from 30% in 2007. Meanwhile, the 2007-2008 
financial crisis has fuelled active public policy debates on issues such as bank 
performance, market concentration (market power), competition, risk-taking, financial 
stability, regulation, and so forth. The rapid recovery of the BRIC economies
1
 and 
their relatively stable banking sectors provide a natural experiment and rare 
opportunity to study these issues. 
 
The relationship between market concentration and performance has long been 
subject to theoretical debates. The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis 
from traditional industrial organization literature suggests a positive 
relationship between market concentration and performance base on the conjecture 
that in a concentrated market large banks collude to earn higher profits (Bain, 1956). 
Affirming this positive relationship, the efficient structure hypothesis, however, 
asserts a reverse causality that efficient banks are more profitable and gain market 
shares, resulting in a concentrated market (Demsetz, 1973). In contrast, the “quiet life 
hypothesis” predicts a negative association between market concentration and 
performance arguing that firms with market power tend to operate inefficiently as 
managers may relax their efforts and enjoy the monopoly profit of a “quiet life” 
(Hicks, 1935). Empirical literature has achieved no unanimity. In the 
European banking sector, the “quiet life” hypothesis is rejected in Maudos and 
                                                        
1All the BRIC economies were hit by the 2007-08 financial crisis and Brazil and Russia even 
experienced a negative growth rate of -0.64% and -7.81% in 2009, respectively. However, the BRIC 
economies recovered rapidly to a growth rate of 7.49% in Brazil, 4.03% in Russia, 8.81% in Indian, 
and 10.4% in China in 2010. 
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Fernandez de Guevara (2007) but accepted in Delis and Tsionas (2009). In the US 
market, an early study of Berger and Hannan (1998) finds strong evidence for the 
“quiet life” hypothesis. A recent study by Koetter et al. (2012) presents a more 
complex picture with a negative association between market power and profit 
efficiency but a positive association between market power and cost efficiency. 
 
On the other hand, bank intermediation involves a variety of risks. Excessive 
risk-taking could lead to bank failures, which in turn may cause bank runs and even 
costly financial crises. Motivated by more frequently occurring financial crises with 
disastrous damages to the economy, a growing body of research addresses the macro 
stability of the banking/financial systems with two contrasting views emerged. The 
competition-fragility view believes that competition may encourage banks to take 
more risks for higher return and thus undermine financial stability, while monopoly 
rents increase a bank’s charter value and discourage risk-taking behaviour (Allen and 
Gale, 2004; Keeley, 1990). The competition-stability view argues that monopoly 
allows banks to charge higher interest rates, which exaggerate the adverse selection 
effect and jeopardize banking/financial stability (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Allen et 
al., 2011; Schaeck et al, 2009). 
 
Other researchers take a micro approach to gauging how risk-taking behaviour 
interacts with bank performance. The “bad luck” hypothesis argues that an increase in 
problem loans caused by precipitated external events induces credit risk and banks 
may become inefficient due to greater efforts and expenses on those problem loans 
(Berger and De Young, 1997). Empirical studies have examined the 
relationship between performance and a wide range of risks, including credit risk, 
capital risk, liquidity risk, market risk, operational risk, and overall risk (Altunbas et 
al., 2007; Berger and De Young, 1997; Brissimis et al., 2008; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
This strand of literature to date is primarily based on the US and European countries 
with, if any, fewer insights and discussions on the banking industry in emerging 
economies. 
 
Over the past decade or so, the banking sectors in developing and transition 
economies have received great research attention. Existing literature has 
examined bank capital buffers (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010), bank distress and 
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financial crisis (Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009; Bongini et al., 2000), banking problems 
in Asian and South American in the 1980s and 1990s (Arena, 2005), and bank 
performance in individual countries (Berger et al., 2005; Jiang et al. 2009) or a group 
of countries (Fries and Taci, 2005; Williams and Ngyen, 2005). There is a big gap in 
the banking literature in that there is no empirical comparative study across the 
BRIC banks despite of their increasingly important role and rising status in the world 
financial marketplace. 
 
In this context, this paper attempts to reveal how market concentration and 
risk-taking behaviour affect bank performance in the BRICs, enriching our 
understanding of how BRIC banks withstood the storm wave of the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis. Our main goal is to fill in the gap and contribute to existing literature 
in the following dimensions. First, we evaluate bank performance and examine the 
impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis across the BRIC banks while controlling for 
the effects of country-, industrial-, and bank-level differences to address the 
heterogeneity of the sample. Second, we test for the “quiet life” hypothesis and 
present new empirical evidence to theoretical debates in the existing literature from an 
emerging market perspective. Given the high policy relevance of the 
concentration-performance relation, this paper provides insights into banking 
industries in the BRICs with important implications for policy makers engaging in 
formulating banking policies not limited to the BRIC countries but also other 
developing countries. Finally, this paper follows the micro approach to examining the 
risk–performance relation in the BRICs’ banking markets. The results will be of 
particular interests to bankers, practitioners, and regulators. 
   
Using a unique sample of major domestic commercial banks in the BRICs over 
2003-2010, we find a negative association between market concentration and 
performance, in support of the “quiet life” hypothesis. We also find that banks with a 
lower level of risks perform better, in favour of prudential practice. Moreover, 
the banking sectors in the BRICs were negatively affected by the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis with China and Russia being the least and most affected, respectively. 
On average Chinese and Brazilian banks outperform Indian and Russian ones, 
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indicating that China and Brazil have more favourable institutional infrastructure. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
evolutionary background of the BRICs’ banking systems. Section 3 reviews literature. 
Section 4 describes research methodology and data. Section 5 discusses empirical 
results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The evolutionary background of the banking systems in the BRICs  
The banking systems in the BRIC countries have experienced rather different 
evolutionary processes. The Brazilian banking system did not start from a Central 
Bank and the first commercial bank dated back to the early 19
th
 century. The Central 
Bank of Brazil was established in 1964 as part of the financial reform to support the 
industrialization plan and fight against inflation. The reform specialized financial 
institutions and laid the foundation for the Brazilian Financial System referencing to 
the American financial model. The Brazilian banking system has two distinct features. 
First, Brazil experienced historical hyperinflation – three digits in the 1980s and well 
over 1000% in the 1990s. Brazilian banks survived and benefited from inflation by 
raising low-cost liabilities that were invested in short term securities at much higher 
interest rates. The high returns from this kind of transactions (known as the “float”) 
covered up the deficiencies of the banking system and disincentivized the 
development of normal banking practice. Second, Brazilian banking market has the 
highest cost of financial intermediation in the world in terms of both absolute interest 
rates and spreads (Miccolis-Anwar, 2007). For instance, over 2003-2010, the average 
net interest spread is 38% in Brazil, which is more than six times of Russia (6%), 
seven times of India (5%), and twelve times of China (3%). 
 
State banks in Brazil played a critical role in financing state-level developments and 
deficits. In the 1980s, most state banks became rather weak, which was hampered by 
the worsening economic condition and public sector deficits. In 1994, the Brazilian 
government implemented the Real Plan to stabilize the economy and control inflation. 
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Without inflationary gains some banks went bankrupt. To avoid a systemic banking 
crisis, the federal government launched the "Program of Incentives for the 
Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System – PROER" and the 
Credit Guarantee Fund to assure public confidence. Subsequently state banks 
underwent significant reforms of restructuring, privatization, or liquidation (Beck et 
al., 2005). 
 
The Russian banking system emerged only in the early 1990s after the collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the late 1980s. The Bank of Russia 
(the Central Bank of the Russian Federation) assumed central banking functions and 
five state banks were commercialized to serve enterprises in their assigned sectors in 
the economy.
2
 Without much surprise, the sudden death of the centrally-controlled 
economic system invited a disaster: the economy collapsed, GDP fell dramatically, 
and inflation rocketed to 2510% in 1992 (Heffernan, 2005). The repercussions for 
the banking system were significant, leading to a series of systemic mini-crises in 
1994, 1995, 1998, and 2004. The causes of these crises are a combination of 
numerous factors, including the absence of a regulatory and supervisory system until 
1995, a massive and uncontrolled privatization schemes from 1992, the 
“pocket banks”
 
serving business groupings or state institutions, under-capitalization, 
the lack of modern banking skills, and resultant poor asset quality (Tompson, 2004).
3
 
After the crisis in 1998, the Bank of Russia took decisive steps to reform the banking 
system and made impressive progresses. After the implementation of the Banking 
Sector Development Strategy over 2005-2008, the Russian government ambitiously 
aims at positioning the banking system on international financial markets during the 
period 2009-2015. Currently, the Russian banking system is dominated by state banks, 
                                                        
2 Five state banks were created in 1987 by taking over commercial operations from the State Bank, 
namely USSR Promstroybank (industry), USSR Agroprombank (agriculture/industrial), USSR 
Zhilsotzbank (housing and social security), USSR Vnesheconombank (foreign trade) and USSR 
Sberbank (the savings bank). 
3 The “pocket banks” were controlled by a single shareholder or a small group of related shareholders 
and they were used as a tool of business groupings or state institutions (Tompson, 2004). 
8 
 
comparatively small, highly fragmented, underdeveloped, largely free of financial 
repression, and with a deposit insurance scheme in place (www.cbr.ru/eng). 
 
Since the independence in 1947, India has been a democratic nation without 
experiencing a centrally-controlled economic system as in former USSR and China. 
The financial system was quite unrestricted until the 1960s when the state took control 
to facilitate the 5-year national economic plans. The government nationalized the 14 
largest commercial banks in 1969 and further 6 in 1980 to support the implementation 
of the national economic plans by channelling funds to priority sectors and 
minimizing the cost of state borrowing. However, in 1991 India was faced with 
severe balance of payment crisis due to a rapidly growing fiscal deficit and rising oil 
prices.
4
 In response, the Indian government initiated a systemic economic reform 
programme toward a market-oriented economy, along with financial deregulation and 
liberalization. From 1996, the government partially privatized state banks to avoid 
costly capital injections while maintaining 60-80% shareholding (Heffernan, 
2005), but the pace of banking reform was slow. The current banking sector is 
dominated by state ownership with poor asset quality, excessive supervision, and 
weak financial institutions. It also faces moral hazard and incentive problems 
stemming from the public belief that state banks will never be allowed to fail. A 
striking feature of the Indian banking system is the preferential lending requirements 
set by the Indian authority. Domestic banks and foreign banks are required to lend 
40% and 32%, respectively, of their adjusted net bank credit (or credit equivalent of 
off-balance sheet exposures whichever is higher) to the priority sectors.  
 
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the banking system 
was entirely dominated by the only bank – the People’s Bank of China (PBC) – to 
serve its centrally-planned economy. Unlike Russian banking system being created 
through a “shock therapy” approach to dismantling the old system, Chinese banking 
system underwent a rehabilitation process from the late 1970s. To transform a 
                                                        
4 Rising oil prices were caused by the first Gulf War in 1990-91. 
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centrally-planned banking system to a competitive market-oriented one, the Chinese 
government implemented a series of banking reforms – institutional restructuring, 
deregulation, and banking commercialization, which, however, failed by the end of 
the 1990s. The banking sector was dominated by the four largest state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) and they were technically insolvent due to the huge 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs). These NPLs were the inevitable 
consequences of the persistent government intervention in banks’ operations to 
support the real economic reform whilst maintaining social stability. In 1998-99, the 
central government had to bailout state banks by injecting capital and removing NPLs 
from SOCBs’ books. As China became a member of World Trade Organization in 
2001, the government accelerated banking reform and partially privatized state banks 
after the second round of bailout. These more radical reforms have made great strides 
in modernizing the banking system and now China is a home to 4 of the world top 10 
largest banks by market capitalization (Berger et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2013). 
 
3. Literature review 
In the past three decades, the banking sectors in the developing countries and 
transition economies have experienced drastic changes for different reasons. For 
instance, banking reforms were caused by the significant political and economic 
changes of 1989 in Russia and the Eastern and Central European countries, 
triggered by financial crises in South-East Asian and Latin American countries, and 
initiated by the governments in China and India to improve bank performance 
to better serve the real sector development. The changing banking landscape has 
attracted great research interest to examine the performance effect of banking reform 
in terms of deregulation, ownership, corporate governance, privatization, foreign bank 
entry, and so forth. 
 
Both theoretical and empirical literature shows that ownership has a significant 
influence on performance. Literature in developing countries and transitional 
economies generally suggests a negative impact of state ownership on performance 
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(Bonin et al., 2005; Fries and Taci 2005; Yao et al., 2007; Jiang et al, 2009), which is 
more significant on profit efficient than on cost efficient (Berger et al., 2009; Jiang et 
al., 2013). Being aware of the poor performance of state banks, many governments 
privatized state banks, which has improved bank performance (Berger et al., 2005; 
Jiang et al., 2013), especially with the involvement of foreign strategic investors 
(Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan and Marton, 2003). As a result of deregulation, 
globalization, and technological advancement, foreign banks have penetrated into 
developing countries. On average the efficiency advantages of foreign-owned banks 
relative to domestically owned banks tend to outweigh the disadvantages in many 
developing and transitional countries (Berger, 2007). 
  
Research on bank performance in the BRICs is mainly single country studies. 
Brazilian and Russian banking sectors are largely un-researched relative to Indian and 
Chinese ones. Findings in general are consistent with literature in developing 
countries and transition economies, except for evidence showing that state banks 
perform better over their private counterparties. In Brazil, research suggests that 
state banks outperform both foreign banks and private banks (Tecles and Tabak, 2010; 
Staub et al., 2010); well-capitalized banks are more efficient (Tecles and Tabak, 2010); 
and bank performance has improved for privatized banks but not for 
restructured banks (Beck et al., 2005). One might not be surprised by the scarcity 
of banking literature in Russia given the short history of the banking system. Among 
two studies we have been aware of, Styrin (2005) reports that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks; and Karas et al. (2010) suggests that public banks are 
more cost efficient than private banks while the introduction of deposit insurance has 
no significant impact on narrowing down the efficiency gap between these two 
types banks.  
 
In India, an earlier study (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997) suggests that public banks are 
the best performers benefiting from deregulation, while subsequent work of 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) finds that the performance effect of deregulation is 
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insignificant. In the post-liberalization period, empirical research suggests 
that banking deregulation has led to performance improvement for state banks (Zhao 
et al., 2010) and state banks outperform private banks regardless of efficiency 
measures employed (Sensarma, 2005; Das and Ghosh, 2009; Sathye, 2003). A more 
recent study (Sanyal and Shankar, 2011) shows that private banks outperform both 
public banks and foreign banks. In China, existing research generally concludes 
that bank performance has improved and joint-stock banks are more efficient than 
state banks (Yao et al., 2007; Ariff and Can, 2008; Berger et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 
2013). Although it may take a longer time to realize the benefits (Jiang et al., 2009), 
foreign minority ownership has a significant positive effect on performance (Berger et 
al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2013). Moreover, Zhang et al. (2012) find that a sound legal 
environment and stronger protection of intellectual property rights help regional city 
commercial banks improve performance. 
 
Literature on the relationship between bank performance and risk-taking is still in its 
infancy. In the US banking market, researchers observe a negative 
association between bank performance and risk taking (Berger and De Young, 1997; 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). In the EU banking markets, empirical evidence is mixed. 
While Altunbas et al. (2007) find no such a negative association as in the US market, 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) provide evidence that banks with a lower level of capital risk 
are more efficient. Brissimis et al. (2008) suggest that bank performance is negatively 
affected by capital risk and credit risk but positively influenced by liquidity risk. 
 
The noticeable absence in literature is a comparative study across the BRIC banks. 
Although the BRIC banks may exhibit a similar dynamic trend in performance when 
facing a big world-wide shock (i.e., the global financial crisis), the quantitative effect 
may vary across the BRICs due to differences in macroeconomic and institutional 
environment, industrial market conditions, and bank specific characteristics. For 
instance, at the country level, stronger institutional and regulatory infrastructure may 
promote more prudential practice which eases the impacts of unexpected shocks 
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on banks. Moreover, existing literature on the relationship between market 
concentration, risk taking and performance have mainly focused on US and 
European banking markets, leaving the issue unexamined in emerging economies. 
This study attempts to fill in the gap in literature by investigating the issue in the 
context of emerging economies. 
 
4. Research methodology 
The preferred estimation technique is the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) which 
pre-specifies a functional form and decomposes error terms into a random error ( iv ) 
and inefficiency ( iu ) (Aigner et al, 1977). SFA is more appropriate for emerging 
markets where measurement errors and uncertainties of the economic environment are 
more likely to prevail. This study estimates a common frontier composed from 
all banks in the sample and employs an output distance function approach in a 
one-step estimation setting (Battese and Coelli, 1995).
5
 A major advantage of the 
distance function approach is the ability to accommodate a production process with 
multiple inputs producing multiple outputs without requiring price information as the 
cost/profit function does. 
 
Following Lovell et al. (1994), the output distance function is defined 
as  0( , ) min : ( / ) ( )D x y y P x   . 0 ( , )D x y  is non-decreasing, positively 
homogeneous and convex in the output vector y  and non-increasing in the input 
vector x . For a firm producing m outputs using n inputs, an output distance function 
in a translog form is: 
                                                        
5 For a cross-countries study, bank efficiencies can be measured against a common frontier or 
nation-specific frontiers. When using a common frontier, the analysis is informative for policy makers 
as measured efficiencies are comparable and studies have made good progress in controlling country 
differences through econometric methods. When using nation-specific frontiers, measured efficiencies 
are not comparable and therefore such comparisons are less informative regarding the policy and 
research questions in relation to the international financial institutions (Berger, 2007). 
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By definition ln 0
oi
tD  . When defining ln
oi
t t
iu D  (i.e., 
t
iu  follows a 
non-negative truncated normal distribution); 2~ (0, )ti vv N   (i.e., 
t
iv  follows a 
standard normal distribution); and tiu  and 
t
iv  are independent, Eq.(2) becomes the 
standard setting of a stochastic frontier model.
6
 
 
                                                        
6 Simultaneous equation bias may exist when both inputs and outputs are included in the distance 
function as regressors. But after the normalization procedure, output ratios may be treated as exogenous 
(Coelli and Perelman, 1996). 
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This paper follows Jiang et al. (2009) and specifies two empirical models – the 
income-based model and the earning asset-based model. When defining inputs and 
outputs, the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) is modified by 
treating total deposits as an output. The income-based model focuses on the efficiency 
of generating income and defines two inputs (total interest expense and non-interest 
expense) and two outputs (net interest income and non-interest income). The earning 
assets-based model explores the efficiency of growing earning assets and defines three 
inputs (total interest expense, labor, and physical capital) and four outputs (net loans, 
total securities, total deposit, and non-interest operating income). Following literature, 
non-interest expenses is used as the proxy for labor (Hasan and Marton, 2003) and 
non-interest income is included to capture the effect of the diversification in bank 
activities, such as off-balance sheet activities. 
 
The technical inefficiency effect model is shown in Eq.(3). 
it
b
bita
a
jtit tControlRiskCRu   

19
18
7
6
2
10    (3)                   
where jtCR is the concentration ratio for the country j in year t; itRisk is a vector of 
risk-taking variables for bank i in year t; Control is a vector of control variables; t is 
a time trend to capture the catching up effect against the shifting frontier. 
 
Market concentration is defined as the sum of the market share (in terms of total 
assets) of the five largest banks. Capital risk is proxied by the ratio of equity to total 
assets (E/A) and a bank with a lower E/A ratio faces higher risk of failure. Credit risk 
is measured by the ratio of NPLs to total loans and a higher ratio indicates that 
the bank is more likely to suffer losses from loan defaults. Market risk is captured by 
the ratio of interbank borrowing to total borrowing and a higher ratio suggests that 
the bank relies more on interbank borrowing and therefore more vulnerable to the 
movements of market rates.
7
 Liquidity risk is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to 
                                                        
7 One may argue that market risks also include risk arising from the movement of foreign exchange 
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total assets and the higher the ratio, the lower the risk that a bank may fail to meet its 
liabilities when they fall due. Overall risk is proxied by the ratio of loan loss reserve 
to NPLs that indicates the bank’s ability to absorb losses from NPLs before eroding 
the bank’s capital. A bank with a higher ratio faces lower risk of going bankrupt. 
 
The first control variable is the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the dummy equals 
zero before 2008 and one after. The country level control variables include GDP 
growth to reflect the macroeconomic environment, and Country dummies to take into 
account the differences in institutional framework and legal systems across the BRICs. 
At the industrial level, the share of state-owned banks and the share of foreign banks 
(in terms of total assets) are employed to gauge the performance effect of ownership. 
The importance of the stock market reveals the impact of capital markets on bank 
performance.
8
 The effect of net interest spread is also controlled given the significant 
differences across the BRIC banks. At the bank level, this study considers the impact 
of Bank size (dummy equals 1 if a bank’s total assets greater than the average total 
assets of the sample and 0 otherwise), Listing status (dummy equals 1 for publicly 
listed banks and 0 otherwise), Revenue diversification (the share of non-interest 
income in total income), and Assets diversification (the share of security in total 
earning assets). 
 
Our unbalanced sample includes major domestic commercial banks in the BRICs over 
2003-2010 with 1001 bank-year observations. Banks are selected if they are on the list 
of the world 1000 biggest banks by The Banker and data are available from the 
                                                                                                                                                               
rates and the ratio of interbank borrowing may not be an adequate measure. We consider that our 
sample only includes domestic commercial banks and these banks’ exposure to foreign exchange risk is 
small given their involvement in international financial markets. 
8 Following the “Financial Structure Dataset” from the World Bank, the importance of the stock market 
is defined as the average of the structure activity and the structure size. The higher the value, the more 
market-based is a country’s financial system. The structure activity is defined as the ratio of two ratios: 
(1) the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP, and (2) the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP; the structure size is also defiend as the ratio of two ratios: (1) the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP, (2) the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. The higher 
the value, the more market-based is a country’s financial system. 
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Bankscope. Data on Chinese banks are obtained from PBC – the central bank of China. 
Data are collected from multiple sources, such as BankScope, the Central Banks’ 
website, World Bank, and IMF. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample, providing a snapshot of 
the banking sectors in the BRICs. The BRICs’ banking markets are relatively 
concentrated with an average five-bank concentration ratio of 61%, ranging from 72% 
in China, followed by 64% in Brazil, to just below 50% in both India and Russia. The 
Chinese banking market is the largest, 5 times greater than the smallest one in Russia. 
State banks dominate in the banking sectors in India and China, while foreign banks 
play a relatively more important role in Brazil and Russia. The capital markets are 
more important in India and Russia relative to Brazil and China. Data also reveal that 
Russian and Brazilian banks are in favour of a diversification strategy, while 
Chinese banks seem to embrace a focus strategy. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Turning to risk taking variables, the BRIC banking sectors are generally 
under-capitalized with an average E/A ratio of 8%, ranging from the highest of 
Russian banks at 16% to the lowest of Chinese banks at 5%. The average NPL ratio is 
5%, higher than an international level of 1-3% for a healthy bank. Indian banks and 
Brazilian banks have the lowest and the highest NPL ratio at 3% and 9%, respectively. 
The BRIC banks on average source 22% of their total borrowings from the interbank 
markets with large variations from 50% for Brazilian and Russian banks to only 
10-13% for Indian banks and Chinese banks. The BRIC banks as a whole hold 
one-third of total assets as liquid assets with substantial variance from only 9% in 
India to 48% in China. Brazilian banks and Indian banks tend to take more overall 
risk with a relatively low LLR/NPL ratio of 75% and 66%, respectively, in contrast to 
Russian banks of 287% and Chinese Banks of 139%. In summary, Indian banks take 
on the highest liquidity risk and overall risk but assuming the lowest market risk and 
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credit risk; Brazilian banks confront the highest credit risk and market risk; 
Russian banks are relatively safe in terms of capital risk and overall risk; and 
Chinese banks are faced with greatest capital risk but the lowest liquidity risk. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1.  Results from frontier estimations 
Table 2 reports the one-step maximum-likelihood estimation results from model 
specifications. Gamma ( 222
uvu   ) is 0.93 in the income-based model and 0.69 
in the earning assets-based model, indicating a high proportion of the error terms 
attributable to inefficiencies. Log Likelihood statistics and LR test also confirm the 
good fit of the models. Moreover, all elasticities are significant and possess the 
expected signs at the geometric mean, fulfilling the property of monotonicity of the 
output-oriented distance function.
9
 The scale elasticity, defined as the negative of the 
sum of input elasticities (Färe and Primont, 1996), is 0.97 in the income-based model 
and 0.98 in the earning assets-based model, consistently suggesting decreasing 
economies of scale for the BRIC banks. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
The estimated average efficiency of the BRIC banks over 2003-2010 is 81% from the 
income-based model and 84% from the earning assets-based model. As shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, unsurprisingly the banking sectors in the BRICs were all negatively 
affected by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis with precipitous drop in performance. 
In the income-based model (shown in Figure 1), from 2007 to 2008, China was the 
least affected country with a reduction in efficiency level by 3 percentage points from 
84% to 81%, while Russia recorded the biggest drop by 18 percentage points from 
86% to 68%. Prior to the 2007-2008 crisis, the performance of the BRIC banks was 
stable at a relatively high level of 80-90%, except for Chinese banks that steadily 
                                                        
9 Table 2 only reports scale elasticities and full results are available from the authors upon request. 
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caught up from 71% in 2003 to 84% in 2007. After 2008, the efficiency level of the 
BRIC banks dispersed: Chinese and Brazilian banks’ performance recovered rapidly 
to 90%; Indian banks stabilized their performance at a level around 75%; and 
Russian banks suffered further losses by 8 percentage points down to 60% in 2010. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The earning assets-based model (shown in Figure 2) shows a slightly different picture. 
The 2007-2008 crisis wiped out bank efficiency by 8 percentage points in Brazil and 
India, 13 percentage points in China, and 22 percentage points in Russia. Prior to the 
2007-2008 crisis, Brazilian and Indian banks steadily improved their efficiency to 
90% which had been enjoyed by Chinese and Russian banks. After the crisis, all 
BRIC banks recovered quickly and reached their highest efficiency levels in 2010, 
except for Russian banks with further efficiency losses by 14 percentage points in 
2009. Russian banks were the most efficient banks prior to the 2007-2008 
crisis but became the most inefficient ones after the crisis. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
5.2. Results from the inefficiency effect model 
The results from the technical inefficiency effect model are reported in Table 2.
10
 The 
estimated coefficients on 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis are positive at the 1% 
significance level in both models, statistically confirming a negative impact of the 
crisis on bank performance. The impact is more significant in the earning asset-based 
model than in the income-based model. The possible reason is that during the crisis 
period banks become more cautious in lending and their lending ability is also 
restricted by the availability of funding, while income can be sustained by increased 
                                                        
10 We have tested for the possible multi-collinearity. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) is 3.9 
(well below 5) for all variables in the inefficiency effect model excluding countries dummies, 
suggesting multi-collinearity problem is not a major issue. 
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spreads between lending rates and borrowing rates with the latter being held down by 
central banks.
11
   
 
We find a negative impact of market concentration (market power) on efficiency, 
which is stronger on income generation than on earning assets growth. The results 
provide strong evidence for the “quiet life hypothesis”. The BRIC banks with market 
power tend to relax their efforts and reap the “monopoly profit” of a “quiet life”. 
These banks may also become inefficient due to the pursuance of objectives other 
than profit maximization, the costs of gaining and maintaining market power, and the 
costs of keeping incompetent managers (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
 
As expected, various risks have significant and differential impacts on bank 
performance. Capital risk affects bank performance differently in two models. In the 
income-based model, the estimated coefficient is negative and marginally significant 
at the 10% significance level, indicating that banks with low capital risk are more 
efficient in drawing income, consistent with literature (Mester, 1996; Brissimis et al., 
2008; Altunbas et al., 2000). In the earning assets-based model, the effect of capital 
risk is positive at the 1% significance level, consistent with the recent work of 
Altunbas et al. (2007). The implication is that over-capitalization may induce 
inefficiency by restricting earning assets growth. Credit Risk has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on bank performance, in line with findings of Berger 
and De Young (1997), Altunbas et al. (2000), and Brissimis et al. (2008). Banks taking 
excessive credit risk are associated with poor performance, which lend support to the 
“bad luck” hypothesis. This impact is more prominent in the income-based model 
than in the earning assets-based model. Market Risk also exhibits a negative influence 
on bank performance. Indeed, greater exposure to interbank markets induces not only 
market risk but also liquidity risk. Interbank markets are vital for banks’ liquidity 
management when the markets function smoothly in normal times, while overreliance 
                                                        
11 For instance, the spreads increased by 2.45 percentage points in Brazil and 1.58 percentage points in 
Russia.    
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on interbank borrowing may cause severe liquidity problems in crisis periods. Our 
results show that liquidity risk positively affects bank performance in both models. 
Banks taking less liquidity risk are inefficient, consistent with the trade off between 
liquidity and profitability and existing studies (Altunbas et al., 2007; Altunbas et al., 
2000; Brissimis et al., 2008). The effect of overall risk on bank performance is 
negative and statistically significant but the magnitude is rather small. Our finding is 
in contrast to Altunbas et al. (2007) that find efficient banks take on more risk using 
the ratio of loan loss reserve to total assets as a measure of overall risk.
12
 
 
Turning to control variables, at the country level, estimation results suggest that GDP 
growth has no impact on bank performance in the income-based model but a 
statistically significant negative impact in the earning assets-based model. The 
BRIC banks seem not benefit in terms of efficiency from the faster than world 
average GDP growth rates of the BRIC economies, partially reflecting their role in 
supporting economic growth rather than improving performance. Coefficients on 
country dummies suggest that Brazil and China have the more favourable institutional 
environment for banks to draw income and to expand earning assets, respectively. 
 
At the industrial level, the share of state ownership is found to be negatively 
associated with bank performance. This finding is consistent with literature in most 
developing and transition economies, but in contrast to most single country studies in 
Brazil, Russia, and India that find state banks are more efficient. The share of 
foreign banks affects domestic banks’ performance negatively, consistent with 
Claessens et al. (2001). The importance of the stock market has a significant impact 
on bank performance and banks in a more capital market-based financial system are 
more efficient in expanding earning assets while become inefficient in raising income. 
This is because high quality borrowers may raise funds from capital markets, while 
they would go to banks for funding in a more bank-based financial system. A larger 
                                                        
12
 More than 75% of BRIC banks’ total earning assets are loans and this study employs the NPL coverage ratio as 
the proxy for overall risk. 
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net interest spread has no impact on raising income but helping expanding earning 
assets. In fact, a larger spread pushes up interest rates, which exaggerates the adverse 
selection effect and undermines bank performance in generating income. On the other 
hand, excessive risks taken by banks due to adverse selection induce moral hazard 
problems that banks may lend recklessly which boost earning assets. 
 
At the bank-specific level, we also observe some interesting findings. Bank-specific 
characteristics have significant and distinct impacts on bank performance: 
Large banks outperform small banks in growing earning assets but not in raising 
income; Listed banks perform better than unlisted ones; and the diversification 
strategy has a negative impact on bank performance with an exception of efficiency 
gains from the diversification of revenue sources in the income-based model. 
 
5.3. Robustness tests  
To test the robustness of our model specifications, we exclude the bank level control 
variables in turn while keeping variables with proven influences on bank performance 
according to literature. Results are reported in Table 3 for the income-based model 
and Table 4 for the earning assets-based model. The columns (1) of these tables are 
the chosen specifications in this paper. Test results indicate that our chosen models are 
robust to the inclusion of a variety of bank-specific characteristics. All estimated 
coefficients on market concentration and risk variables possess the same signs without 
substantial changes in the significance level. One exception is the capital risk that is 
slightly sensitive to the exclusion of bank level control variables but the effects are 
not significant enough to change our conclusion regarding capital risk. As to the 
country level and the industrial level control variables, the results also suggest that our 
final specifications are robust. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
[Table 4 around here] 
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Moreover, as SFA is criticized for the predetermination of a functional form and the 
distributional assumptions of the random errors and inefficiencies, we also employ 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to check the robustness of our results. The average 
efficiency level from DEA models is 66% in the income-based model and 79% in the 
earning assets-based models, lower than those of 81% and 84% from the 
corresponding SFA models. These results are consistent with literature that the 
nonparametric techniques generally give lower efficiency estimates (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). As to the inefficiency effect analysis, results from DEA models are 
qualitatively consistent with those from SFA models relating to our main concern of 
market concentration and risk variables. The significance level of the estimated 
coefficients from DEA models has generally decreased and the income-based model 
appears to be more robust than the earning assets-based model.
13
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigates the relationship between market concentration, risk-taking, 
and bank performance using a sample of commercial banks in the BRICs over 
2003-2010. Our main results, which are robust to alternative model specifications and 
estimation techniques, are as follows. First, the estimated average efficiency of 
BRIC banks is 81% in the income-based model and 84% in the earning assets-based 
models – a moderate and healthy level. The 2007-2008 financial crisis has a 
significant adverse impact on bank performance and BIRC banks recovered 
immediately in 2009 except for Russian banks that suffered further efficiency losses. 
Interestingly, the BRIC banks do not benefit from their fast growing economies as our 
results show that GDP growth has no or adverse impact on bank performance. 
Secondly, we find a negative association between market concentration and 
performance, implying that the “quiet life” hypothesis holds in the BRICs’ banking 
markets. Thirdly, we observe a negative association between performance and credit 
risk, market risk, and overall risk but a trade off between performance and liquidity 
                                                        
13
 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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risk. The implication is that banks may improve performance by taking less credit risk, 
market risk, and overall risk, which enhance the stability of the banking sector. Finally, 
results from a wide range of control variables at the country-, industrial-, 
and bank-level are also independently valuable. Brazil and China have more 
favourable institutional infrastructure for banks to operate more efficiently. State 
ownership and foreign banks have negative impacts on bank performance. 
Listed banks subject to market disciplines and public scrutiny perform better. Our 
results may provide important policy implications for bankers and regulators in the 
BRICs as well as other developing and transition countries. 
 
Despite the rising status of the BRICS (including South Africa) with 43% of the 
world’s population and healthier economic growth than Europe and the US, 
their banking sectors are under-researched. At the BRICS summit in March 2013, 
leaders from the BRICS nations agreed to create a contingency fund of $100 billion 
and proposed the BRICS Development Bank that focuses on infrastructure 
development. Apparently, future research is urgently needed for better understanding 
of the banking markets in the BRICS. Future research may address following issues. 
First, banking reforms in these countries are still ongoing and it takes time for the full 
impact of the special measures taken in the crisis period to materialize. For instance, 
during the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese government took 
aggressive measures to stimulate the economy via its banking system. These issues 
need to be followed up. Second, future work may take a macro approach to 
investigating the connections between performance, financial stability, and 
competition from an emerging market perspective thereby providing information for 
policy makers. Last but not least, issues relating to the proposed BRICS 
development bank (i.e., the viability and feasibility) require immediate research 
attention.  
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Figure 1: The Technical Efficiency Level from the Income-based Model 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Technical Efficiency Level from the Earning Assets-based Model 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Full Sample  Brazil India Russia China 
 No. Obs: 1001 No. Obs: 92 No. Obs: 219 No. Obs: 184 No. Obs: 506 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Inputs and outputs variables           
Operating income* 1643  4164  3881  5147  1060  1889  974  2145  1731  5012  
Net interest income* 1260  3342  2779  3540  628  997  600  1565  1498  4211  
Total  non-interest operating income* 382  1028  1102  1705  432  1001  374  762  233  898  
Net Loans* 22890  66374  16946  25095  14020  22410  8689  19697  32974  89650  
Total Securities * 11141  36456  17711  23406  7427  11658  1798  4433  14952  49061  
Total Customer Deposits* 32858  109773  16874  24922  18924  28651  7985  20768  50840  150195  
Total interest expense* 1021  2281  2672  3428  1155  1857  572  1170  826  2364  
Total non-interest expenses* 1103  2657  2795  3741  746  1408  748  1671  1079  2994  
Fixed assets* 492  1543  343  534  206  242  422  1029  668  2045  
Inefficiency effects variables           
Market concentration 61  12 64 3 47 3  48  4  72 2  
Risk-taking           
Capital Risk  8  7  10  4  6  2  16  12  5  3  
Credit Risk 5   8  9  6  3  3  5  9  6  9  
Market Risk  22  22  49  20  10  8  50  25  13  9  
Liquidity Risk 34 21 29 21 9 3 26 11 48 15 
Overall Risk 178 189  75  23  66  23  287  258  140  160  
Control variables           
GDP  8.6 3.9 4.0 2.5 8.3 1.5 4.7 5.3 11 1.6 
Share of state-owned banks  60  14  32  3  73  2  40  3  67  1  
Share of foreign banks  7.1  6.6  20.9  1.5  7.5  0.6  13.9  4.7  1.9  0.3  
31 
 
Importance of stock market 1.2  0.89  1.3  0.37  2.0  0.75  2.1  0.49  0.5  0.26  
Net interest spread  7.9  10.41  37.7  3.37  4.9  0.59  6.5  0.97  3.3  0.18  
Bank size * 50455  153975  45953  63842  24751  38970  13471  28521  75848  209350  
Revenue Diversification  19.3  20.5  20.6  18.3  32.6  11.1  39.5  28.1  6.0  5.5  
Assets Diversification 24.7  14.0  46.9  18.0  34.6  6.8  14.3  9.0  20.1  9.4  
Note: (1) * Values are in million US dollars (2005 price level); (2) NPL – non-performing loans; LLR – loan loss reserve (3) Operating Income = Net Interest Income＋
Total Non-Interest Operating Income, Pre-Impairment Operating Profit = Operating Income - Total Non-Interest Expenses (overheads), Operating Profit = Pre-Impairment 
Operating Profit - Loan Impairment Charge - (Securities and Other Credit Impairment Charges). 
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Table 2. Estimation Results  
 
 
Income-based model 
Earning assets-based 
model 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Frontier  Regression     
Scale elasticity 0.97  0.98  
Sigma-squared ( 222
uv   ) 
0.60  11.86  0.10  12.01  
Gamma( 222
uvu   )  
0.93  99.58  0.69  17.68  
Log likelihood   -110.56    149.22  
LR test    615.19    341.85  
Inefficiency Effects Analysis     
2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis  0.62  4.39  0.98  9.32  
Market concentration 15.63  10.36  2.01  3.45  
Risk-taking variables     
Capital Risk  -1.31  -1.31  0.89  3.62  
Credit Risk 3.35  6.55  0.81  4.67  
Market Risk  3.37  9.96  0.74  6.16  
Liquidity Risk  2.62  5.65  1.35  11.63  
Overall Risk -0.004  -3.27  -0.002  -9.55  
Control variables: 
Country level 
  
  
GDP Growth 0.97  0.78  4.09  6.22  
Brazil  -2.13  -3.41  6.26  8.15  
India  2.94  4.85  0.43  1.89  
Russian 2.87  4.15  5.67  9.13  
Industrial level     
Share of State-owned Banks 7.23  5.03  17.77  12.18  
Share of Foreign Banks 12.72  9.09  5.22  4.76  
Importance of Stock Market 0.93  3.71  -0.72  -8.94  
Net Interest Spread 3.53  2.41  -3.40  -2.81  
Bank level     
Bank Size 0.25  1.85  -0.25  -3.83  
Listing Status -0.81  -6.52  -0.19  -5.90  
Revenue Diversification  -0.60  -1.94  0.84  7.12  
Assets Diversification  3.24  7.57  1.57  8.74  
Time -0.16  -2.86  0.05  4.16  
Constant -21.19  -9.93  -15.34  -12.19  
Note: (1) As the dependent variable in the inefficiency effect model is the estimated inefficiencies, a 
negative sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that the particular variable has a positive effect on 
efficiency and vice versa; (2) The country dummy of China is excluded from the estimation for 
comparison purposes. 
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Table 3. Robustness test: the income-based model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value 
2007-2008 Financial crisis dummy 0.62  4.39  0.84  4.35  0.77  4.57  0.77  5.23  0.71  4.00  0.77  4.68  0.88  4.50  
Market concentration 15.63  10.36  18.43  9.75  16.57  11.59  16.20  13.30  14.58  11.62  15.18  12.21  14.29  8.81  
Risk-taking variables               
Capital risk (Equity/assets) -1.31  -1.31  -1.05  -1.23  -0.98  -1.36  -1.55  -2.84  -0.31  -0.34  0.05  0.06  -0.06  -0.07  
Credit risk (NPL ratio) 3.35  6.55  3.42  6.51  3.38  6.31  3.34  6.19  3.56  6.41  3.60  6.52  3.60  6.04  
Market risk 3.37  9.96  3.72  9.32  3.65  10.02  3.16  10.23  3.54  8.68  3.30  9.54  3.44  8.65  
Liquidity risk  2.62  5.65  2.65  6.23  2.59  5.74  2.54  5.50  2.71  4.61  2.12  4.72  2.13  4.04  
Overall Risk -0.004  -3.27  -0.005  -7.46  -0.005  -7.96  -0.004  -8.01  -0.006  -9.12  -0.006  -9.43  -0.006  -8.14  
Control variables               
GDP growth rate 0.97  0.78  1.73  1.17  1.27  0.89  1.64  1.43  1.06  0.87  1.19  1.01  1.91 1.24  
Brazil  -2.13  -3.41  2.43  1.16  0.72  0.27  -2.44  -3.15  -0.54  -0.60  -0.25  -0.24  1.45  0.82  
India  2.94  4.85  3.83  5.77  3.24  4.37  2.69  4.37  3.59  6.53  3.53  5.62  3.08  4.49  
Russian 2.87  4.15  6.36  3.75  5.01  2.48  2.57  3.76  3.59  2.80  3.32  2.60  4.45  3.03  
Share of state-owned banks 7.23  5.03  13.07  3.72  11.02  2.80  7.27  4.69  10.32  3.12  9.16  2.90  12.73  2.95  
Share of foreign banks 12.72  9.09  4.00  0.84  5.54  0.99  16.25  13.87  13.45  9.39  14.33  12.39  12.58  4.70  
Importance of stock market 0.93  3.71  0.99  3.88  1.00  4.40  0.95  3.75  0.59  2.85  0.56  2.27  0.63  2.39  
Listing status -0.81  -6.52  -0.83  -6.17  -0.78  -7.99  -0.81  -6.96  -0.99  -6.91  -1.03 -6.52  -1.04  -6.20  
Net interest spread 3.53  2.41    2.62  1.08  2.84  2.24  5.57  2.06      
Bank size 0.25  1.85  0.30  2.47    0.18  1.34  0.42  3.51  0.47  3.22    
Revenue Diversification -0.60  -1.94  -0.73  -3.28  -0.72  -2.33    -0.44  -1.34      
Assets Diversification 3.24  7.57  3.21  7.77  3.22  6.94  3.22  8.18        
Time -0.16  -2.86  -0.19  -3.47  -0.18  -4.30  -0.21 -3.86  -0.19  -3.47  -0.21  -3.37  -0.26  -3.75  
34 
 
Table 4. Robustness test: the earning assets-based model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value s  t-value 
2007-2008 Financial Crisis 0.98  9.32  0.57  1.17  0.27  5.90  0.08  2.20  0.37  7.88  0.11  3.21  0.12  3.91  
Market concentration 2.01  3.45  1.53  1.46  0.18  0.36  0.68  1.61  1.10  2.08  0.69  1.75  0.72  3.05  
Risk-taking variables               
Capital Risk  0.89  3.62  0.64  4.22  0.20  1.06  0.09  0.39  0.39  1.43  0.05  0.27  -0.01  -0.08  
Credit Risk  0.81  4.67  0.75  1.35  0.44  4.67  0.31  2.00  0.43  2.68  0.29  2.03  0.22  1.65  
Market Risk  0.74  6.16  0.72  7.59  0.35  5.21  0.51  5.69  0.48  4.23  0.49  6.10  0.40  6.30  
Liquidity Risk  1.35  11.63  1.29  1.63  0.61  23.46  0.27  3.19  0.74  5.94  0.25  3.00  0.20  3.20  
Overall Risk  -0.002  -9.55  -0.001  -2.22  -0.001  -2.16  -0.002  -5.36  -0.001  -3.13  -0.003  -14.78  -0.002  -10.59  
Control variables:               
GDP growth rate 4.09  6.22  2.06  0.89  1.59  3.42  0.50  0.94  1.42  2.63  0.82  1.59  0.82  1.94  
Brazil  6.26  8.15  3.70  3.93  1.92  6.69  2.00  5.14  2.69  6.03  2.67  8.29  2.32  8.08  
India  0.43  1.89  0.33  0.52  0.03  0.15  -0.15  -1.00  0.33  1.62  -0.03  -0.20  -0.02  -0.21  
Russian 5.67  9.13  3.62  6.16  1.89  18.07  1.93  6.80  2.34  6.45  2.14  7.85  1.95  9.11  
Share of state-owned banks 17.78  12.18  12.46  12.67  6.78  17.94  7.67  10.20  8.34  8.94  8.18  11.95  7.41  11.96  
Share of foreign banks 5.22  4.76  4.98  7.77  3.20  2.61  0.96  1.55  4.15  7.04  0.99  1.69  1.27  2.09  
Importance of stock market -0.72  -8.94  -0.43  -1.62  -0.30  -12.04  -0.09  -2.09  -0.36  -7.05  -0.11  -2.63  -0.10  -3.10  
Listing status -0.19  -5.90  -0.13  -6.75  -0.12  -9.29  -0.06  -2.25  -0.12  -3.52  -0.06  -2.41  -0.06  -2.48  
Net interest spread -3.40  -2.81    -0.36  -0.43  2.14  2.44  -0.96  -1.07      
Bank size  -0.25  -3.83  -0.18  -2.36    -0.13  -3.30  -0.16  -3.58  -0.14  -3.37    
Revenue Diversification  0.84  7.12  0.67  4.47  0.33  3.05    0.56  5.41      
Assets Diversification 1.57  8.74  0.98  6.44  0.74  6.64  0.57  3.21        
Time 0.05  4.16  0.037  1.75  0.02  2.16  0.32  8.87  0.03  2.85  0.27  7.13  0.13  9.15  
 
